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cess, based on a mere disagreement with the user's message, they engage in viewpoint discrimination. 1 0 Because these practices threaten to undermine free speech protections, the First Amendment should apply to online public and limited purpose forums through a net neutrality doctrine. Simply put, infringements on civil liberties that would never be allowed in the physical world should not be permitted in the virtual world. 11
When ISPs discriminate against Internet speech based on that speech's content, they are doing precisely what the First Amendment forbids. In doing so, ISPs are engaging in conduct that would never be allowed if it were to occur in a public park or town hall meeting. The American Civil Liberties Union has recognized the dangers present in a world without net neutrality:
Without the principle of network neutrality, "network providers are free to discriminate." Companies that offer the portals to connect to the Internet "are not considered 'state actors' that trigger free speech protections under the First Amendment.... [T] hey can effectively shut down the 21st century marketplace of ideas by screening Internet e-mail traffic, blocking what they deem to be undesirable content, or pricing users out of the marketplace. "' 12 Permitting ISPs to restrict access or disrupt the free flow of data is like facing a soda machine and having only three choices: coke, diet coke, and cherry coke. Thus, absent a compelling justification that is narrowly tailored to achieve a legitimate goal, ISPs should be prohibited from undermining a user's First Amendment freedoms. 13 10 Id.
' See, e.g., Steffe, supra note 4, at 1154-55. 2 See id. at 1160 (quoting Internet Freedom and Innovation at Risk: Why Congress Must Restore Strong Net Neutrality Protection, ACLU (Sept. 22, 2006) available at http:// www.aclu.org/freespeech/intemet/26829res20060922.html.) 13 See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REv. 1267 , 1315 -16 (2007 (discussing strict scrutiny and stating that "there are three
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DEPA UL J. ART, TECH. & IP LAW [Vol. XXV: 267 Of course, ISPs (and website operators) are private entities, but when they have substantial control over a medium "used for purposes of assembly, communication of thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions,"' 4 they have the power to impact users' free speech rights.1 5 This is not to say that ISPs and website operators cannot prohibit obscenity,' 6 fighting words, 1 7
and defamation,' 8 and, in some cases regulate the time, place, and manner of speech that may offend particular users. 19 They cannot, crucial steps in applying the formula: (1) identifying the preferred or fundamental rights the infringement of which triggers strict scrutiny; (2) determining which governmental interests count as compelling; and (3) giving content to the requirement of narrow tailoring").
14 United States v. Am. Library Ass'n. 539 U. S. 194, 215 (2003) See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) . The Miller Court defined obscenity as follows:
The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value. Id.
RILEY V. CALIFORNIA 271 however, block or slow traffic to suppress unpopular speech, or restrict access because of a disagreement with the message-or messenger. After all, the very purpose of the First Amendment is to promote the "free and robust debate of public issues, ' 2° an "uninhibited marketplace of ideas," 21 and the "advancement of knowledge and the search for truth. ' '22 The Internet is the new marketplace of ideas. Accordingly, the First Amendment should protect against infringements on internet speech in the same manner that the As long as ordinances are content neutral, they may limit the time, place, and manner of speech are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech" ... "serve a significant governmental interest" ... are "narrowly tailored to serve [that] 497, 510 (2010) . The Court has relied on principles of democracy when upholding the First Amendment rights of corporations:
[T]here is practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs." If the speakers here were not corporations, no one would suggest that the State could silence their proposed speech. It is the type of speech indispensable to decision making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation rather than an individual. The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual. Id. (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) 26 See, U.S. CONST., AMEND. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized"). 27 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2492 (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 345 (2009 Modern-day network neutrality seeks to maintain the Internet's original "dumb," end-to-end architectural principle by prohibiting common carriers--ISPs--from interfering with the transmission of packets over their networks, whether by artificially slowing down or blocking those packets, or by any other means that selectively inhibits the natural flow of packets over their network. Id.
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Riley is the beginning of a new jurisprudence that applies time-honored constitutional principles to twenty-first century forums where fundamental civil liberties are exercised and must be protected. In Riley, the Court unanimously held that law enforcement officers could not search the contents of an arrestee's cell phone without a warrant. 30 The Court rejected the Government's argument, based on Chimel v. California, 3 1 which determined that warrantless searches of an arrestee's cell phone were permissible to protect officer safety and preserve evidence. When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the officer's safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
2015]
DEPAULJ. ART, TECH. &IPLAW [Vol. XXV: 267 Court distinguished its prior holding in Smith v. Maryland, 33 which upheld law enforcement's use of a pen register to monitor a suspect's outgoing phone calls from a private residence.
34
The Riley Court relied on three justifications to differentiate cell phones from plastic containers, cigarette packs, or pen registers: (1) storage capacity, (2) the quality of information stored on cell phones, and (3) the pervasive use of cell phones in modem society. 35 Unlike the telephone at issue in Smith, a cell phone stores vast quantities of personal information and thus implicates unique privacy concerns.
For example, most smart phones can store sixteen gigabytes of information, which "translates to millions of pages-of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos." 37 In fact, "[e]ven the most basic phones that sell for less than $20 might hold photographs, picture messages, text messages, Internet evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule. Id. 33 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) . 34 Id. at 744. In Smith, the Court relied largely on the fact that Petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in outgoing telephone calls:
Petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and "exposed" that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business. In so doing, petitioner assumed the risk that the company would reveal to police the numbers he dialed. The switching equipment that processed those numbers is merely the modem counterpart of the operator who, in an earlier day, personally completed calls for the subscriber. id. 35 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (upholding the search of a crumpled cigarette pack found on the arrestee's person that yielded fourteen grams of heroin); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460, n. 4 (1981) (upholding the search of a container, which the Court defined as an "object capable of holding another object"). 36 Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. at 2489 ("Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be kept on an arrestee's person"). Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016] Second, the type of information contained in cell phones resembles the private papers and effects traditionally protected under the Fourth Amendment. 39 Moreover, " [a] phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information never found in a home in any form... , 40 In fact, cell phones can hold "in one place many distinct types of information-an address, a note, a prescription, a bank statement, a video-that reveal much more in combination than any isolated record."4'Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained how pre-digital era cases would not protect this information from unwarranted searches:
The fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery. The fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years. And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow law enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical form. 42 Simply put, warrantless cell phone searches would give "police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a person's private effects. 44 Indeed, it is "the person who is not carrying a cell phone, with all that it contains, who is the exception.'A5 In fact, "it is no exaggeration to say that many of the more than 90% of American adults who own a cell phone keep on their person a digital record of nearlY every aspect of their lives-from the mundane to the intimate. ' Moreover, it did not matter that, " [p] rior to the digital age, people did not typically carry a cache of sensitive personal information with them as they went about their day, ' A 7 did not "make the information an less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought."
And searches of cell phones bore "little resemblance to the type of brief physical search ' 49 that the Court confronted in other cases. Thus, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement must have probable cause and procure a warrant before searching an arrestee's cell phone.
50
The Court's decision in Riley stands for two fundamental propositions. First, pre-digital era case law addressing warrantless searches in the context of physical objects does not apply to modem technological devices. The Riley Court recognized that applying pre-digital era precedent to cell phones would unmoor the search incident to arrest doctrine from its original justifications and result in searches that infringed on privacy protections.
1
In fact, detachment from the search incident to arrest doctrine's original justifications allowing for infringement on constitutional privacy protections had already occurred in other contexts. In the years following Chimel, searches incident to arrest steadily " Id. at 2485.
45 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 ("According to one poll, nearly threequarters of smart phone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12% admitting that they even use their phones in the shower"). 
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10 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016] In New York v. Belton, 54 the Court upheld the search of a jacket found in the passenger compartment of an arrestee's vehicle, even though the arrestee was already in police custody and could not reach for or access the jacket. Noting the jacket was located "inside the passenger compartment of the car in which the respondent had been a passenger just before he was arrested,, 55 the Supreme Court nonetheless held that the jacket was "within the arrestee's immediate control ' 56 within the meaning of Chimel. Justice Brennan dissented and categorized the decision as "a dangerous precedent that is not justified by the concerns underlying Chimer' 57 and "inconsistent with every significant searchincident-to-arrest case." 1, 15 (1977) (invalidating a search that was "conducted more than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents were securely in custody; the search therefore [could not] be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified by any other exigency"); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 425 (1981) (distinguishing between automobiles and immovable objects, the latter of which requires law enforcement to have probable cause and obtain a warrant). 
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an arrestee's vehicle "when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle." 60 This time, Justice Stevens dissented, writing that "uncovering potentially valuable evidence ... must give way to the citizen's constitutionally protected interest in privacy when there is already in place a well-defined rule limiting the permissible scope of a search of an arrested pedestrian." 61 Thereafter, in Arizona v. Gant, 62 the Court narrowed Belton by limiting searches incident to arrest to areas within the arrestee's reach, 63 but re-affirmed Thornton by holding that searches incident to arrest are permissible where law enforcement reasonably believes "the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest. ' 6 By this point, Chimel had morphed from a narrow rule to a rule that permitted law enforcement to evade, if not entirely disregard, the Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement. In fact, the Chimel justifications no longer served as meaningful limitations on searches incident to arrest, leading one commentator to note that the Supreme Court had stretched Chimel's reasoning "beyond its breaking point."
repository of ersonal effects, ' 66 cell phones implicate basic privacy interests. 6 p Stated simply, cases from an era of rotary telephones, roll-o-decks, and black and white televisions did not consider or even contemplate the complex interplay between digital devices, government surveillance, and civil liberties. Put differently, pen registers are not analogous to cell phone towers 68 and mobile tracking devices that law enforcement uses monitor the whereabouts of its citizens, 69 just as plastic containers are not analogous to cell phones. Importantly, however, cell phones are analogous to private homes, just as the Internet is analogous to a public sidewalk.
Second, the original meaning and purpose of the Fourth Amendment-to protect citizens from unreasonable searchesapplies to conduct that the Founders could not foresee. Stating that "the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, '70 the Court correctly held that storing private information on a cell phone "does not make the information any less worthy of the protection." 71 Indeed, allowing law enforcement to conduct searches of a cell phone's contents incident to arrest would have resulted in the type of "broad, non-particularized searches," that were "one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself., 72 The Court's decision in Riley ushered the Constitution into the digital era-not by interpreting the Fourth Amendment expansively, but by returning to its original meaning. Chief 66 Carwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) 72 Id. at 2494 ("the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation's response to the reviled 'general warrants' and 'writs of assistance' of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity.")
Justice Roberts' majority opinion reflects the principle that times may have changed, but that does not mean civil liberties warrant any less protection.
Riley supports a net neutrality doctrine. In the same way that the Fourth Amendment protects private data from unreasonable searches regardless of whether the data is stored in a closet or cell phone, the First Amendment protects speech from content discrimination regardless of whether it is disseminated on the sidewalk or through a search engine. It is the speech, not the device that matters, particularly because the line between public forums and personal space, and the real and virtual world has collapsed, and because free, open, and robust debate is the cornerstone of ã 73 democratic society.
II. INTERNET SPEECH: THE NEW MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Internet speech is equivalent to the physical areas that the Court has traditionally designated as a public or limited purpose .public forum.
A. Public and Limited Purpose Public Forums
Unlike Riley, legal issues involving online speech are not governed by outdated case law. To the contrary, the Court's precedent provides the framework by which to protect speech in the virtual world. To begin with, the level of protection afforded to speech, and the validity of government regulations, depends in substantial part on the forum within which it is expressed. The Court has classified forums as: (1) public; (2) designated or limited purpose public; and (3) non-public. Of course, private property owners may restrict access to their property and prohibit unwanted speech.
73 See, e.g., Mark C. Alexander, Citizens United and Equality Forgotten, 35 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499, 503 (2011) ("Speech is at the core of our democratic process, and is an essential part of "a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open").
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Public Forums
Public forums are places that "by long tradition or by government [] have been devoted to assembly and debate." 74 These areas have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." 75 Thus, "the rights of the state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed. ' ' 76 The government may not regulate speech based on its content 7 7 unless it is "necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end." 7 8 It may, however, enact reasonable restrictions of time, place, and manner, provided they are "contentneutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication.", 79 Public streets and parks are examples of public forums. 
2015]
RILEY V CALIFORNIA
Public, Limited Purpose, and Non-Public Forums
The Internet is the equivalent of traditional public forums, limited purpose public forums, and non-public forums. The Internet's traditional public forum refers to the free and open transfer of data between networks, which ISPs control. The Internet's limited purpose public forum refers to websites that are held out to the public as forums for debate on matters of public concern. Non-public forums refer to personal blogs, websites, and social media where the owner has an unconditional right to speak and assemble without granting access to disfavored content or viewpoint. The Pre-Digital Era Analogs to Digital Devices As discussed below, ISPs and website operators can infringe substantially on first Amendment Protections. First, ISPs can discriminate on the basis of the user's identity (e.g., a business competitor or political rival) or the content of a user's speech. Second, websites operators can discriminate based on viewpoint, either by deleting disfavored comments or restricting access to members who have unpopular opinions. Both practices violate the First Amendment.
Preventing Content Discrimination in the Traditional Public Forum. Treating ISPs As Common Carriers or Radio Broadcasters
Without a new neutrality doctrine, First Amendment freedoms in the virtual world will be under attack in the same way that privacy rights were under attack before Riley.
ISPs can compromise free speech protections in a variety of ways. The first is through "traffic shaping," 90 a practice that "involves slowing down some forms of traffic, like file-sharing, 89 Some courts apply different tests depending on whether the speaker falls within the class of individuals that the government intended to benefit by creating limited public forum. See, e.g., Fighting Finest v. Bratton, 95 F.3d 224, 225-28 (2d Cir. 1996) (if the speaker falls within the intended class, strict scrutiny is applied; if the speaker falls outside of the class, rational basis review is applied).
90 Steffe, supra note 4, at 1158.
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18 DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016] , Art. 2 https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol25/iss2/2 RILEY V CALIFORNIA while giving others priority." 9 1 This is accomplished by limiting available bandwidth, which enables ISPs to favor certain categories of speech over others. Comcast, for example, has been accused of manipulating the available bandwidth of its users so that users of popular peer-to-peer programs, such as BitTorrent and eDonkey, would become frustrated and terminate any pending transfers., 92 This practice is akin to allowing pro-life advocates to march in the public square, while restricting pro-choice advocates to a dark alley near a cemetery. It permits ISPs to discriminate against "websites that are resource intensive ... offer services that might compete against an ISPs own services ... or even discourage traffic to networks it disapproves. ' " 93 In addition, ISPs can restrict access to online content. For example, ISPs view websites, such as CNN, as potential sources of income and charge user fees to access an ISP's subscribers, which can number in the millions. 94 This permits ISPs to "hold a website at ransom ' '95 and forces websites "to choose between complying and exploring new sources of revenue by either eliciting higher fees for advertising on their websites or charging users fees for use, or simply dissolving." 9 6 What is worse, organizations that sell commercial products or promote public debate on matters of political and social importance may fail to reach a substantial audience and, in some cases, cease operating altogether. Simply put, ISPs can structure their fees in a manner that undermines competition, thwarts innovation, and frustrates open public debate.
The effect on users is substantial. By restricting access to, or slowing the delivery of, commercial and political speech, users are deprived of vast quantities of information. The Internet is a hub for free market competition, the free exchange of information, and the free flow of ideas on topics that span the political, social, artistic, and literary spectrum. Indeed corporations throughout the 
2015]
world "rely heavily on the Internet and services provided over the Internet to conduct business ... [and] to communicate efficiently.", 97 Furthermore, the Internet has taken center stage in political campaigns and become a forum for public debate over matters that promote the very foundation our individual freedoms are based upon. 98 One commentator states:
Despite the scant attention it received from politicians during the 1990s, early online political activists expected the Internet to be "the dominant political medium by the year 2000." While their timetable for dominance may have been a bit optimistic, the massive growth in Internet use during the last few years of the twentieth century began the push in that direction. TECH. 15, 54-55 (2007) . 99 . At the beginning of the twenty-first century, politicians began using the internet as a campaign tool:
Thanks to increased accessibility, by the 2000 election, presidential candidates viewed the Internet as an ally. Candidates used the Internet to raise money, to make announcements, and to post their policy positions, speeches, and criticisms of their adversaries. Also by the 2000 election cycle, candidates had begun coupling these less-passive websites with database technology to identify likely voters who might be receptive to their messages. This technology let politicians tailor their messages to specific voters so they could, through technology, establish a "personal, one-on-one relationship" with citizens.
Id.
or blocking those packets, or by any other means that selectively inhibits the natural flow of packets over their network. "' 6 As the FCC has recognized, consumers would benefit substantially from a net neutrality doctrine:
Consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of their choice ... to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement to connect their choice of legal devices that do not harm the network[;] ... [and] to competition among network providers, application and service providers, and content providers. 07
In fact, the Court has recognized that First Amendment principles apply to the Internet precisely because it has become a forum for disseminating protected speech:
Unlike the conditions that prevailed when Congress first authorized regulation of the broadcast spectrum, the Internet can hardly be considered a "scarce" expressive commodity. It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds ... This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, as well as interactive, realtime dialogue. Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer ... our cases provide no basis for qualifying the level of First Amend-1 6 1d. at 1155. 107 id.
22
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2016] The proper way to promote free speech and guard against content-based discrimination is through a new neutrality doctrine.
ISPs may argue that decisions regarding pricing constitute commercial speech, and that regulating this practice would amount to impermissible restrictions on this speech. In addition, even if ISPs were subject to the First Amendment, practices involving pricing are based on content neutral factors, such as the numbers of emails a corporation sends. This argument fails to consider that ISPs have primary control over the flow of information between networks, and thus have the power to infringe on free speech rights. Additionally, otherwise-permissible speech may be regulated if the secondary effects of this speech bring it into a category that does not enjoy First Amendment protection.1 0 9
Limited Purpose Public Forum: Websites For Public Comments on Matters of Public Concern
ISPs are not the only entities that can infringe First Amendment freedoms online. Various websites such as The National Review and Huffington Post hold themselves out as forums for debate on political and social issues. In doing so, these websites make available to the public a forum within which users can debate a variety of public policy issues. This certainly enhances the robust exchange of information and creates an online marketplace of ideas historically, but it can also be a vehicle for viewpoint discrimination, in the same way that cell phones became a vehicle for intrusive searches into an individual's private life.
For example, National Review Online, a conservative forum, could require that registered democrats pay a twenty-five dollar fee before gaining access to the "Comments" section of each
